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INTRODUCTION 
AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The cross appeal presents the narrow legal question of 
whether a lease which required the tenant to construct a shopping 
center, also obligated the tenant to perform necessary repairs in 
order to "maintain" such improvements. Although the Lease 
required Manivest to "be responsible for the entire demised 
premises" and "during the term of the Lease to maintain the same" 
(Ex. 1 115), the trial court ruled that Manivest was obligated to 
maintain the land on which the shopping center was built but not 
the improvements. Tr. 190.1 
Because of Manivest's numerous other material and persistent 
defaults, this did not prevent the trial court from ruling that 
the Howes had properly terminated the Lease. It did, however, 
prevent the Howes from introducing a great deal of evidence which 
2The trial court was called upon to decide this issue with 
very little notice. Although the court had previously ordered 
that all dispositive motions be filed before the trial so that 
they could be heard on a Monday (R. 344), Manivest did not serve 
its Motion in Limine until after business hours on Monday, 
March 5, 1990, the evening before the trial commenced (R. 419). 
On the first day of trial, the Howes argued that the Motion 
in Limine was untimely, that it could be dispositive of Count Two 
of their Complaint, and that it should not be considered until 
after all of the evidence had been received and the parties had 
adequate time to brief the issue. Tr. 176 1. 24 to 177 1. 8. 
Nevertheless the court ordered that the Motion be argued the next 
morning, before hearing from the Howe's expert witnesses 
regarding the condition of the roof and parking lot. Tr. 180 
1. 22 to 181 1. 4. 
established that Manivest1s breach of its duty to maintain the 
improvements was an independently sufficient reason for 
terminating the Lease.2 
Manivest1s admissions during trial indicate a course of 
performance under the Lease which is inconsistent with the 
court's ruling. Manivest admitted during the trial that the 
Lease was an "entirely net lease" (Tr. 316, 1. 1-10); that 
substantial repairs were necessary (Id. at 361-2); and that 
Manivest, not the Howes, was responsible for "anything associated 
with the operation" of the shopping center. Jd. at 315, 1. 22-
25; see Ex. 29, 43 and 45. The additional evidence which the 
Howes proffered, would have corroborated the meaning of the Lease 
and the parties intent.3 
Manivest has failed to adequately address the Howe's posi-
tion that a covenant to "maintain" is an independent covenant to 
"repair". By failing to address this issue and by acknowledging 
According to the Restatement, Second, Property (Landlord 
and Tenant) (1977) (hereafter, the "Restatement"), where the 
lease provides the remedy of forfeiture, the "right to terminate 
is widely recognized, for example, for the tenantfs failure to 
repair as promised. . ." Jd. Section 13.1, Reporter Note 9. 
Augusta Corp. v. Strawn# 174 So.2d 422 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965). 
3The proffered testimony of both Mr. Cowley, the attorney 
who represented the tenant, and Mr. Carpenter, the broker who 
brought the parties together, related directly to the parties' 
intent in 1960 that the maintenance obligation apply to the 
structures. Tr. 230-32. The testimony of Mr. Frazier would have 
related to the industry standards for maintenance of shopping 
center improvements. Tr. 229-30. Such critical testimony was 
clearly relevant to the interpretation of the Lease. 
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that the Lease was an entirely net lease, Manivest has in effect 
admitted that it had a duty under the contract to maintain the 
improvements. Any other interpretation renders illusory and 
superfluous the words: "be responsible for", "maintain", and 
"entire demised premises" as used in the Lease. Manivest's 
rebuttal is superficial and inadequate. 
I. THE HOWES GAVE MANIVEST MORE THAN ADEQUATE 
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE. 
Manivest asserts that its failure to maintain the 
improvements, including the roof and the parking lot, was "not 
the subject of any notice or opportunity to cure." Reply Brief 
at 23 (emphasis added). This is not true. Manivest ignored 
repeated notices and persistently refused to cure the defaults. 
The March 1988 letter from the Howes to Manivest --the 
Howe's very first communication about the defaults -- did not 
simply allege a general violation of paragraph 5 of the Lease. 
It specifically addressed the condition of the improvements, 
stating: "the surface of the parking lot is not and for some 
period of time has not been in good order or repair." Ex. 30. 
By the end of March 1988, the defaults had already existed 
for well over 60 days.4 Nevertheless, after becoming aware of 
4The Valley Bank loan dated from early December of 1987. 
Ex. 16, 17 and 18. The weeds had grown the prior year and been 
exposed by receding winter snow. Ex. 30. The parking lot had 
been in disrepair for several years. Ex. 25, 26 and 28. 
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the defaults, the Howe's took reasonable and responsible action. 
See Reply Brief at 9, n. 7. The Howes did not immediately send a 
notice of termination or file a lawsuit. Instead, they wrote the 
March 1988 demand letter and specifically advised Manivest of the 
problems that were then apparent. Manivest did nothing to solve 
the maintenance problems -- not then, and not even prior to the 
time of trial, almost two years later. 
After the March 1988 notice, the Howes continued to insist 
that the physical condition of the improvements was at issue. In 
April of 1988, the Howes served another strongly worded letter. 
Ex. 30. At the end of May, they served the notice of termina-
tion. Ex. 31. As of late July, however, Manivest still had not 
dealt with any of the problems. Ex. 32 (Letter dated July 27, 
1988) . 
Litigation followed. In November the Howes filed their 
Complaint alleging that Manivest had breached its maintenance 
obligation and that the improvements were "in need of substantial 
maintenance and repairs." R. 0002 1122. In June of 1989, 
Manivest filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in which it charac-
terized Count Two of the Howe's Complaint as dealing only with 
weeds on the property. R. 102 1I4B. In their written Response, 
the Howes reaffirmed that their concerns also dealt with other 
maintenance issues. R. 210 116. 
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During discovery the Howes gave further notice to Manivest. 
Initially, the Howes did not have access to, and had not 
inspected, the interior of the buildings or the roofs. During 
discovery, the Howes attempted to obtain permission from Manivest 
and its attorneys to perform an inspection. R. 356 at ffl8-20; 
R. 369 flfll-6. The Howes thus continued to assert that the 
physical condition of the improvements was at issue. 
Manivest still refused either to cure the defaults or to 
cooperate, so in January of 1990, the Howes served Manivest with 
a Motion to Permit Access. At that time, the Howes reiterated 
that the condition and maintenance of the improvements were at 
issue. R. 250. Certainly this pleading gave further notice, and 
Manivest acknowledged as much by finally allowing the Howes and 
their expert witnesses to inspect the improvements. Still, 
Manivest did nothing before the trial. 
It would be quite another matter if Manivest had seized any 
of its numerous opportunities to discharge its maintenance 
obligations. Instead, it refused. Consequently, at trial, Swen 
Mortenson admitted that "major roof work needs to be done" and 
that the cost of redoing the parking lot "was approximately 
$200,000." Tr. 361, 1. 7 to 362, 1. 2.5 When asked why the 
5Mr. Hawkes would have testified that the roof had outlived 
its useful life and that the cost of repair was approximately 
$150,000. Id. at 226; Ex. 41. 
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work had not yet been accomplished, Mr. Mortenson cavalierly 
explained: 
Q. [by Mr. Carlston] Are there any major 
expenses that you anticipate with respect to 
the shopping center property? 
A. [by Mr. Mortenson] Oh yes. 
Q. Such as? 
A. Well, we had -- in 1988 in our budget we had 
planned to put at least $30,000 in the 
parking lot - in 89 we were going to put 
$30,000 in the parking lot and we have been 
unable to do so because of this lawsuit. 
Q. You've been unable to do so because of this 
lawsuit? 
A. Would you put money in here if you was 
threatened to lose the center? 
Tr. 361, 1. 7-18. In other words, Manivest did not defer main-
tenance because it had not received adequate notice. Manivest 
refused to spend money on the improvements so that it could milk 
every last dollar out of the shopping center until the date of 
the trial.6 
None of the authorities upon which Manivest relies suggests 
that the Howes repeated notices were not sufficiently specific. 
For example, in Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976) 
6For breach of the covenant to repair, the landlord may both 
"terminate the lease and recover damages." Restatement § 13.1. 
See Pinqree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 
(Utah 1976). The court's ruling on Manivest's Motion in Limine 
kept out evidence of the amount of deferred maintenance and thus 
precluded the Howes from receiving an award of substantial 
additional damages. 
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the seller attempted to forfeit the buyer's rights under a real 
estate sales contract even though "there was no contact or 
communication between the parties", id. at 1153 (emphasis 
added). The buyer had absolutely no idea whether the seller 
intended to waive the default, enforce it, or accept delayed 
performance. Ld. at 1154. Moreover, before receiving any demand 
from the seller, the buyer had "made a tender of all sums due 
under the contract." id. at 1154 (emphasis added). By contrast, 
Manivest allowed two years to pass, knowing full well that the 
Howes intended to enforce their rights under the Lease. 
In Reeploeq v. Jensen, 490 P.2d 445 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971), 
rev'd on other grounds 503 P.2d 99 (Wash. 1972) (en banc) cert. 
den. 414 U.S. 839 (1973), the trial court forfeited the buyer's 
interest under a real estate sales contract when the buyer failed 
to make payments and to keep the improvements in good repair. 
The seller gave written notice of default, but allowed the buyer 
only 30 days to cure. Within that time, the buyer tendered all 
back payments but was unable to complete the repairs. 490 P.2d 
at 446. The trial court enforced the forfeiture despite proof 
that the repairs could not have been economically performed 
within 30 days, and that they were accomplished within a 
reasonable period of time. Id. 
The Court of Appeals found that the seller's notice of 
default failed to provide a reasonable cure period within which 
the buyer could perform the repairs, id. at 447. But the seller 
-7-
alleged that the buyer's "full" payment was insufficient because 
it did not include attorneys fees allegedly due. The Court of 
Appeals held that i_f a buyer has otherwise tendered satisfactory 
performance, the seller can not forfeit the contract for having 
failed to receive attorneys fees. Id. 
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the decision and 
allowed the forfeiture to stand. Although it reached this 
decision on procedural grounds,7 the Supreme Court justified its 
action by noting that the trial court "had considered the 
relative equities" and that "[wjhile that court might have given 
the [buyer] a period of grace," the trial court had correctly 
"taken into account the apparent inability of the [buyer] to 
perform her contractual obligation." 503 P.2d at 104. The Court 
also justified the result based upon the "delays caused by the 
[buyer], and the worry and expense of litigation to which the 
[seller had] been subjected." Ld. Thus, the Washington Supreme 
Court disagreed with the forfeiture analysis of the Court of 
Appeals' decision upon which Manivest relies. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court decision in Reeploeq suggests that there is no 
7One panel of the Court of Appeals had previously dismissed 
the buyer's appeal for lack of prosecution. On certiorari, the 
Washington Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Later, another 
panel of the Court of Appeals reinstated the appeal upon certain 
conditions. The first panel then heard the appeal and reversed 
the trial court decision. The Supreme Court concluded that one 
appellate panel had no jurisdiction to overrule another, that the 
dismissal of the appeal became final when the Supreme Court 
affirmed it, and that all subsequent proceedings were void. 
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reason to set aside the forfeiture of the Lease because Manivest 
did not take advantage of its opportunity to cure. 
Tower v. Halderman, 782 P.2d 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) is 
also inapplicable. There the seller under a real estate contract 
had alleged only two defaults in its notice of cancellation: the 
buyer's failure to remove certain contingencies and the buyer's 
failure to approve a new loan. At trial, under cross 
examination, the seller conceded that the buyer had performed 
both of these obligations before the seller sent the cancellation 
notice. The seller then argued that the contract was automatic-
ally terminated on the scheduled closing date. The contract, 
however, specifically required notice and gave the buyer 13 days 
to cure the breach after the notice, id. at 720. Thus, the 
notice itself recognized that the contract continued for an 
additional 13 days. Under these circumstances, the Halderman 
court refused to allow the mere passing of the specified closing 
date to be the basis for cancellation. The Halderman court also 
found evidence that the seller had acted in bad faith. While 
attempting to terminate the contract, the seller had "several 
remaining tasks as seller, none of which he ever made any effort 
to perform." Id. at 722. Thus, the seller not only repudiated 
the contract prematurely, but impeded the buyer's ability to 
perform. 
In this case, there was no evidence that the Howes had acted 
in bad faith or impeded Manivestfs ability to perform. Indeed, 
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Manivest failed to disclose the assignment to the liquidating 
trust until just a few days before the trial8 and stalled the 
Howe's efforts to perform an inspection. Manivest thus kept the 
Howes from being more specific in their demands. Moreover, 
Manivest never did tender full performance. 
Finally, Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988) held 
that "absent a contract provision to the contrary," the seller 
may signal its intention to enforce its rights by initiating 
legal action. Td. at 1089. Certainly, the Howes1 lawsuit was 
notice of the most unequivocal character that they intended to 
exercise their rights under the Lease. Manivest's failure to 
have even explored the defaults alleged in the pleadings through 
timely discovery does not allow it to ignore this "most solemn 
form" of notice. See Annot. 5 ALR2d 968, 975 (1949). 
Not only did the Howes strictly comply with terms of the 
Lease, they went well beyond its requirements. Their method of 
giving notice was reasonable, repetitive, specific and far more 
generous than what was required by the Lease. There was no 
uncertainty as to their intent. In such circumstances, Utah 
courts have consistently recognized the landlord's right to 
insist upon its contractual remedies, particularly when the 
tenant has not taken advantage of a grace period. Howe's Opening 
Brief 45-46. 
;Tr. 97, 1. 5-8. 
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II. THE HOWES' EVIDENCE DID DEMONSTRATE THE CONDITION OF 
THE IMPROVEMENTS BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE MARCH 1988 NOTICE. 
Manivest argues that the Howes1 evidence "was irrelevant" 
because it did not pertain to the condition of the property 
"prior to May 31, 1988." Reply Brief at 23. This argument was 
not raised at trial, neither in the examination of the numerous 
witnesses nor by way of objection to any of the exhibits. 
Furthermore, it is unsupported by any authority, and it misstates 
the evidence. 
Although some of the proffered testimony related to the 
dilapidated condition of the improvements in early 1990, this 
condition did not arise overnight. The Court received as 
evidence photographs from early 1985 (Ex. 25), from mid-1985 (Ex. 
26), and from March, May, June and July of 1988 (Ex. 28). These 
photographs demonstrated that the parking lot had been sorely 
neglected for some time and that it was already in terrible 
condition when the Howes first gave notice of default. 
Moreover, Manivest had remained in possession but had 
performed no repairs to either the roof or parking lot since the 
Howes first gave notice of default. Surely, therefore, the 
Howes' expert witnesses would have been competent to testify 
about the condition of the parking lot and the roofs in 1988 and 
the continued deterioration since that time. Dixon v. Stewart, 
658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). The basis for their expert testimony 
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included personal inspections, historical records and 
photographs, as well as their own specialized knowledge and 
experience. 
III. THE LEASE REQUIRED THE TENANT 
TO CONSTRUCT THE SHOPPING CENTER IMPROVEMENTS. 
Manivest argues that the Lease "did not require that the 
shopping center be built but only gave the tenant the option to 
do so." Reply Brief at 23 (emphasis added). To the contrary, 
paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Lease specifically required the 
tenant to construct a shopping center. Those paragraphs read as 
follows: 
22. The Lessee covenants and agrees to commence 
construction of the shopping center herein 
contemplated within 4j5 days of the date of this 
Agreement, and to thereafter diligently proceed 
with the development and construction of said 
shopping center. 
23. Time is of the essence of this Agreement, 
including the provisions of paragraph 22. Ex.1 
(emphasis added). 
IV. THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE "STRUCTURAL" REPAIRS. 
Manivest attempts to characterize this as a case involving 
"structural" repairs. Reply Brief at 23. It argues that even a 
net lease does not bind a tenant to make structural repairs, 
citing as its sole authority Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST 
-12-
Realty, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).9 Neither the 
record nor the authorities support this argument. 
The obligation which the landlord sought to impose upon the 
tenant in Mobil Oil is quite different from that which Manivest 
agreed to undertake. In Mobil Oil the landlord asked the tenant 
to reconstruct a major portion of a multi-level parking structure 
which already existed on the property when the lease commenced. 
Id. at 659. The court concluded that these repairs were 
"structural" and that the parties had not addressed such 
unforeseen repairs in the lease, id. at 661. The court 
distinguished "ordinary repairs" - those "that are the result of 
ordinary wear and tear on the lease property" - and recognized 
these as the tenantf s obligation. Id. The Mobil Oil court 
correctly distinguished between the tenant's duty to repair 
ordinary wear and tear from the responsibility to provide massive 
"structural" additions to a building which already existed when 
the lease commenced. Id. at 660-61. 
9Mobil Oil's relevance to the present dispute is tenuous, at 
best. Mobil Oil did not hold that an agreement to "maintain" 
premises only applies to the raw land - the critical issue in 
this case. The Mobil Oil court merely held that when there "was 
no provision for structural repairs," the "other portions of the 
lease defining a 'net' lease ... cannot be used to create a 
promise to make [structural] repairs." Idk at 660. The Mobil 
Oil case, in which the lease was "silent as to who should pay," 
id., is of little relevance to the Howe Lease in which the tenant 
agreed not only to construct all of the improvements but to "be 
responsible for" and "maintain" the "entire demised premises." 
Ex. 1 US. 
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When a defective condition has been caused by normal weather 
conditions and aging over a period of years, the repairs do not 
thereby become structural or extraordinary so as to relieve the 
tenant of responsibility. Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. Rubin, 493 
S.W.2d 74, 76 (Miss. Ct. App. 1973). The obvious need regularly 
to resurface a flat asphalt roof or to maintain an asphalt 
parking lot, does not turn these into structural repairs just 
because they are deferred. Indeed, when Manivest filed its real 
property tax appeal in 1989, Manivest acknowledged that 
"considerable deferred maintenance [had] accumulated." Ex. 29 
(Letter dated August 15, 1989). This resulted from normal 
weather conditions and aging over a period of years, without 
routine maintenance. Thus, the Howes did not demand that 
Manivest make "structural" repairs. 
V. THIS CASE INVOLVES A "LONG TERM" NET LEASE. 
On page 24 of its Reply Brief, Manivest represents that the 
ten year lease in Mobil Oil was a "long term" lease. But the 
Missouri Court of Appeals has actually distinguished Mobil Oil as 
a "short-term" lease case. Washington University v. Royal Crown 
Bottling Co., 801 S.W.2d 458, 465-6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). In 
Washington University, the court said that Mobil Oil did not 
establish a "broad rule which can be extended to the very 
-14-
different circumstances presented by long-term net leases." Id. 
at 465. 
Washington University involved a 25-year lease of commercial 
property which required the tenant to improve and modernize one 
existing building, demolish another and construct a new building. 
Thus, like Manivest, the tenant was required substantially to 
improve the premises. Moreover, as in the present case, the rent 
was fixed, the tenant bore the cost of all casualty and liability 
insurance, and the tenant had a right to purchase the property. 
Furthermore, in the past the tenant had accepted responsibility 
for repairs, as did Manivest. Tr. 84, 1. 17-24; id., at 315, 1. 
22-25; Ex. 27, 29, 43 and 45. 
The Washington University court concluded that the tenant 
was required to bear "all costs of repairs and maintenance" for 
all of the improvements, "including the cost of structural 
repairs." 801 S.W.2d at 466. It did so based on the length of 
the term, the opportunity for the tenant to amortize repair 
costs, and the fact that the lease was a net lease.10 
10The court quoted and relied upon Professor Friedman's 
explanation of a net lease, which is recited on page 54 of the 
Howes' Opening Brief. id. at 466. 
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VI. THE TERM "DEMISED PREMISES" 
INCLUDES THE IMPROVEMENTS. 
The Washington University case is consistent with other 
decisions which have considered the meaning of the term "demised 
premises." Such courts have repeatedly recognized that the term 
must be considered in the context of the entire lease. 
For example in Trust Company of Georgia v. S. & W. 
Cafeteria, 103 S.E.2d 63, (Ga. Ct. App. 1958) the court found 
that the word "premises" could have different meanings in 
different contexts but that in this case it clearly meant the 
land, the buildings and the tenant's leasehold estate. Id. at 
72. The court said: 
[T]he definition is not inflexible and [the] word must 
be construed in accordance with its context. As a 
matter of course the word must be given meaning in 
harmony with the other provisions of the contract in 
which it is contained so as to give reasonable and 
rationale import to the whole instrument. 3ji. at 71. 
When the narrow question is whether buildings are included, 
it is generally held that the word "premises" means both the land 
and the buildings thereon. Bachenheimer v. Palm Springs 
Management Corp., 254 P.2d 153, 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953). 
In Benenson v. Ritzman, 108 N.Y.Supp.2d 521 (N.Y. S.Ct. 
1951) the court rejected the tenant's demand that at the end of 
the lease the tenant be compensated for the buildings. The court 
explained its reasoning as follows: 
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A lease of land carries with it the building erected on 
the land. The general maxim of the law is that what-
ever is fixed to the realty becomes a part of it, and 
partakes of all of its incidents and properties. This 
is the rule, even in the relationship of landlord and 
tenant. Icl. at 527 (citations omitted, emphasis 
added). 
There, as here, the buildings did not exist when the lease 
commenced. They were erected by a tenant pursuant to the 
original lease, which had been assigned, renewed and continued 
for several years. 
In an "entirely net lease", it is appropriate that the 
maintenance obligation include the buildings and the parking lot 
rather than merely the land. In its ordinary sense, the word 
"maintain" means "to hold or keep in any particular state or 
condition." Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.). 
Thus, if it applies only to raw land, the covenant "to maintain" 
would preclude development; it would be directly contrary to the 
obligation to construct the shopping center improvements on the 
land. If it applies to the improvements, however, it is 
consistent with the tenant's obligation to construct the shopping 
center and to not allow any violations of government ordinances 
or regulations. Ex. 1 MI5, 22.n 
nManivest suggests that it had full discretion regarding 
maintenance because the Howes' possessory interest in the 
structures did not come into fruition until some years later. 
But the Howes' reversionary interest was a present, marketable 
interest. Its value was directly affected by both the present 
and the projected future condition of the improvements. The 
Howes thus had a strong interest in assuring that the 
improvements were maintained properly. 
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CONCLUSION 
During this dispute, Manivest and its affiliates trans-
ferred all of their assets to the Manivest Liquidating Trust. 
Ex. 40. Therefore, the Howes now have faced up to the fact that 
an award of damages for Manivest's failure to maintain the 
improvements would be a Pyrrhic victory — a mere invitation to 
another collection lawsuit for additional damages against an 
already insolvent trust. Jd. For that reason, and in the 
interests of judicial economy, the Howes have agreed that if the 
court affirms the trial court's decision to forfeit the Lease, 
the case need not be remanded to the trial court for further 
action on the covenant to maintain. 
In the event, however, that the court were to reverse 
the forfeiture, the Howes respectfully submit that the trial 
court's decision on Manivest's Motion in Limine should be 
reversed,, The Howes should be entitled to proceed with their 
claims that Manivest breached its obligation to "be responsible 
for" and to "maintain" the improvements. In retrospect, it is 
clear that the trial court erred when it prematurely construed the 
maintenance language of paragraph 5 to apply only to the land. 
DATED this /7 day of September, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Bv U L^JL Q <1~1£-^ 
Michael R. Carlston 
Max D. Wheeler 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of September, 1991, I 
caused the original and nine true and correct copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANTS to be hand-delivered to 
the Utah Supreme Court and four true and correct copies to be 
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to: 
Ronald E. Nehring, Esq, 
James A. Boevers, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael R. Carlston 
Exhibit 8 
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC. PEAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT 5 !N\'ESTMFN~ 
January 22, 1988 
Mr. and Mrs. Gerrit M. Steenblik 
5501 East Camelhill Road 
Phoenix, Arizona 85018 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Steenblik: 
Recently, we completed a loan transaction with Valley Bank; 
and in doing so, they have taken an assignment of our leasehold 
interest at the South Lake Shopping Center. 
We are enclosing two copies of the Assignment of Lease 
which has been executed by us and by the lender. Attached to this 
assignment is an acknowledgement which we would like signed. Would 
you please sign where your names appear, have your signatures notar-
ized, and return one copy to us in the enclosed self-addressed 
envelope. 
Thank you for your help. The second copy of the assign-
ment is for your file. 
Sincerely, 
r 
Larry K-\ Leeper 
Vice President 
LKL/st 
Enclosures 
cc: John Howe 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT 
ROBERT E. HOWE, BONNIE F. HOWE, WILLIAM K. EVANS, CAROL H. EVANS, 
JOHN 0. HOWE, MAXINE HOWE, GERRIT M. STEENBLIK, and JUDITH H. STEENBLIK, 
Lessors under the Lease described in the above and foregoing Assignment, 
hereby acknowledge the Assignment of Lease between Borrower and Bank and 
agree to give Bank fifteen (15) days notice of any claim or default against 
the Borrower under the above-described Lease and to allow Bank the oppor-
tunity to correct any such default within such period. 
The undersigned acknowledges that the Lessee is encumbering their 
interest in the property and said loan is hereby approved as required by 
said lease. 
The undersigned Lessors agree not to change or modify the terms of 
the above-described lease without notice to Bank. 
The Lessors acknowledge that the Lease is in full force and effect 
and the Borrower is not in default. 
Lessors acknowledge that Bank shall have no present obligation 
under the Lease and that Lessors shall look solely to Borrower for perfor-
mance, subject to Bank's right to cure any default following written 
notice. 
The foregoing Assignment and this Acknowledgement shall continue 
in full force and effect until written instructions to the contrary are 
received from Bank. All notices and demands made to the Lessors shall be 
in writing and shall be delivered personally or sent by first class mail, 
postage pre-paid, addressed to Lessors at the address set forth below. 
DATED as of this day of January, 1988. 
LESSORS: 
ROBERT E. HOWE 
BONNIE F. HOWE 
WILLIAM K. EVANS 
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CAROL H. EVANS 
JOHN 0. HOWE 
MAXINE HOWE 
GERRIT M. STEENBLIK 
JUDITH H. STEENBLIK 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, ROBERT E. HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknow-
ledged to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
Address for notice purposes: 
Valley Bank and Trust 
80 West Broadway 7/330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, BONNIE F. HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknow-
ledged to me that she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, WILLIAM K« EVANS, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknow-
ledged to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, CAROL H. EVANS, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknow-
ledged to me that she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, JOHN 0. HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires:
 m 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, MAXINE HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me that she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, GERRIT M. STEENBLIK, the signer of the above instrument who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, JUDITH H. STEENBLIK, the signer of the above instrument who duly 
acknowledged to me that she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
-7- Residing at: 
